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Anatomy of a Trade Dispute: 
The Question of Softwood Lumber 
Peter A. Piliounis* 
It has been called "the longest and messiest trade war Canada 
and the United States have ever had."1 Without a doubt, the issue of 
softwood lumber pricing has long been a major irritant in Canada-
United States trade relations. On three separate occasions, the United 
States has launched a countervailing duty investigation into Canadian 
timber pricing practices. Softwood lumber plays a key role in the 
economies of several Canadian provinces and American states.2 The 
stakes are not only high for softwood lumber products, 3 but any decision 
made on softwood lumber could also have an enormous impact on other 
forest products and the trade in natural resources as a whole. 
The question of subsidization of natural resources is a contested 
issue around the world. At issue with softwood lumber is the method in 
which certain Canadian provinces price their timber for cutting. Each 
province has its own procedure for setting the price to sell the rights to 
cut standing timber on provincial Crown land. This price paid by the 
logging companies for the timber is referred to as a 'stumpage fee'. In 
general, Canadian stumpage fees are lower than their counterparts in 
the United States. 
The softwood lumber case illustrates the controversy over valu-
ation and possible subsidization of natural resources by posing two 
fundamental questions: 
1) Do natural resource subsidies constitute countervailable 
domestic subsidies under Article XVI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)? 
2) If natural resource subsidies are considered countervailable, 
do Canadian practices with regard to softwood lumber stumpage 
fees constitute such a subsidy? 
The answers to both questions are not clear. This study traces the 
development of the softwood lumber dispute and United States trade law 
as they relate to both issues, including potential future actions and 
political implications. 
The key points raised by this study rest on the definition of 
"subsidy" and whether a countervailable subsidy has been provided to 
Canadian softwood lumber producers, especially in the four major 
softwood producing provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and 
Quebec.4 
The internal United States process for determining whether a 
countervailing duty should be imposed is made up of two components. 
The first requires an injury to an American industry, which is deter-
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mined by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC). 
While this process might also merit analysis, the main areas of dispute 
for softwood lumber are over findings from the second element of a 
countervailing duty investigation. 
This second component of the investigation is carried out by the 
United States International Trade Administration CITA). The ITA 
decides whether the practices in question are ones that can be subject to 
a countervailing duty under United States trade law. Thus, this study 
focuses on the criteria used by the ITA and how they fit into international 
trade law under the Free Trade Agreement (FTA)5 and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
PREVIOUS DEVELOPMENTS 
The two decisions of the ITA during the 1980s regarding softwood 
lumber turned on entirely different answers to the questions posed 
above. They differed not only on whether Canadian stumpage prices 
could be considered countervailable subsidies, but also whether any 
benefit provided by lower stumpage fees was in itself specific enough to 
be countervailable. 
The 1983 Final Negative Determination 
In 1982, a group of American lumber producers launched an 
action against Canadian lumber, alleging unfair subsidies and asking 
for a countervailing duty of sixty-five per cent. 6 In the Final Negative 
Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Softwood Products from 
Canada (Lumber 1),7 the ITA rejected these arguments. It found that 
any benefits provided to manufacturers, producers or exporters in 
Canada were de minimus and, therefore, did not constitute 
countervailable subsidies under the United States Tariff Act of 1930.8 
However, those programmes that the ITA deemed to constitute de 
minimus benefits did not include Canadian stumpage practices (with 
the minor exception of some aspects of the Ontario and Quebec pro-
grammes).9 
The ITA held that stumpage pricing practices did not constitute 
an export subsidy because "they do not operate and are not intended to 
stimulate export rather than domestic sales, and because they are not 
offered contingent upon economic performance".10 The ITA also deter-
mined that stumpage practices did not constitute a countervailable 
domestic subsidy within the meaning of Section 771(5)(B) of the United 




The provision of capital, loans or loan guaran-
tees on terms inconsistent with commercial con-
siderations. 






The grant offunds or forgiveness of debt to cover 
operating losses sustained by a particular in-
dustry. 
The assumption of any costs or expenses of 
manufacture, production, or distribution. 
The ITA interpreted provisions (i)-(iv) to be mutually exclusive, 
so that if a programme clearly fell within one of the subsections, it had 
to be measured against the standard provided in that subsection.12 In 
this situation, the ITA decided that the appropriate provision was 
Subsection (ii) because it involved the provision of goods (here, stands of 
timber) by a government. No subsidy was found since the ITA held that 
stumpage programmes did not softwood lumber producers with 
lumber at 'preferential rates'.1 
This finding went against the American lumber industry peti-
tioners, who had argued that the stumpage programmes should fall 
under Subsection (iv) as an 'assumption' of the cost of production. The 
ITA interpreted 'assumption' narrowly, to mean "government activity 
which relieves an enterf rise or industry of a pre-existing statutory or 
contractual obligation." 4 The ITA also suggested that even a broader 
interpretation of Subsection (iv) would not find a subsidy since stumpage 
programmes did not reduce (or assume) a cost of production. In reaching 
this conclusion, the ITA rejected making a cross-border comparison of 
stumpage prices in Canada with those in the United States. It suggested 
that such a comparison would be "arbitrary and capricious" for several 
reasons, most notably the wide variations in climate, terrain, accessibil-
ity, size, quality, and density oftimber.15 The ITA even suggested that 
if all the appropriate differences were taken into account and adjusted 
for, Canadian prices for standing timber did not differ significantly from 
United States timber and in some instances might even be higher.16 
Notwithstanding this, even if stumpage prices were considered 
to be subsidies, the ITA found that the benefits were not provided to a 
specific industry or group of industries as required by American trade 
legislation.17 The ITA considered stumpage fees to be the same 
regardless of the industry or enterprise using the timber. Therefore, any 
benefit accruing from stumpage prices was considered to be available 
generally. Most notably, the ITA found that any limitation on use of the 
timber was attributable to the nature of timber extraction itself and not 
to any actions taken by Canadian governments.18 
To further decide the specificity question, the ITA considered 
which industries benefitted from the stumpage fees and found that 
several different industries used the timber, each requiring different 
equipment and processing. Those industries were: 
1) Lumber and wood products industries; 
2) Veneer, plywood, and building boards industries; 
3) Pulp and paper industries; 
4) Furniture industries; and 
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5) Other industries- producing turpentine, charcoal, 
wood alcohol, and food additives.19 
The ITA also noted that under both the Canadian and American 
industrial classification systems, the lumber, pulp and paper, and 
furniture industries constituted at least three different groups of indus-
tries. In light of the findings of general availability without government 
intervention and use by diverse industries, stumpage fees were held to 
be available generally.20 · 
Some have even suggested that this ruling was decided in 
Canada's favour because of the political climate in Canada-United 
States relations and not on the merits of the case.21 It has been alleged 
that at that time, Prime Minister Trudeau threatened President Reagan 
with ending cruise missile tests in Canada if a countervailing duty were 
imposed on softwood lumber. As we shall see, almost all aspects of this 
case are weighted with political overtones and could potentially have an 
impact in fields totally unrelated to softwood lumber. 
Developments in United States Trade Law 1983-1986 
Between the Lumber I negative determination in 1983 and the 
subsequent preliminary positive determination in 1986, circumstances 
had not significantly changed in Canadian stumpage practices and 
policies. What had changed, however, was United States trade law. In 
Cabot Corp. v. United States, 22 the United States Court ofinternational 
Trade (CIT) heavily criticized the ITA for its interpretation of what 
constituted a countervailable subsidy when considering natural re-
sources. Cabot Corp. v. United States involved judicial review of an ITA 
decision in a Mexican case on the general availability of carbon black 
feedstock to producers of carbon black, which is used primarily in the 
rubber industry. In that case, the ITAhad ruled against a countervailing 
duty for reasons similar to those given in Lumber /.23 Upon review, the 
CIT made it very clear that "the generally available benefits rule as 
developed and applied by the ITA is not an acceptable legal standard for 
determining the countervailability of benefits".24 The court instead 
found that certain programmes, while having the intention or appear-
ance of being generally available, had the effect of being conferred upon 
specific industries or enterprises and, thus, were countervailable. The 
court held: 
The appropriate standard focuses on the de facto case by 
case effect of benefits provided to recipients rather than 
on the nominal availability ofbenefits.25 
The ITA applied the new test laid out by the CIT in its administrative 
review of the Carbon Black case in late 1986.26 However, prior to the 
final determination, the ITA took the unusual step of briefing Senators 
from lumber states about the new test for specificity. Some argue that 
75 
SOFTWOOD LUMBER 
this briefing was little more than a "green light" for lumber producers to 
launch a new countervail action.27 
The 1986 Preliminary Positive Determination 
Applying the newer broader specificity test, a different conclu-
sion was reached in Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Deter-
mination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada ("Lumber 
II"). 28 The ITA changed not only its ruling on whether stumpage prices 
were generally available, but also considered stumpage to be a method 
of preferential pricing and, therefore, countervailable. 
To decide whether stumpage practices were de facto specific, the 
ITA laid out the following three factors to consider: 
[1] The extent to which a foreign government acts to 
limit the availability of a programme; 
[2] the number of enterprises, industries, or groups 
thereof which actually use a program, which may in-
clude the examination of disproportionate or dominant 
users; and 
[3] the extent to which the government exercises discre-
tion in making the programmes available. 29 
When the ITA considered stumpage programmes against these criteria, 
it held that the Canadian governments involved exercised "considerable 
discretion in the allocation of stumpage licenses."30 Although the ITA 
admitted difficulty locating information on this point, it held that this 
discretion skewed the allocation of stumpage rights toward the softwood 
lumber industry. 
The ITA also went on to state that the number of enterprises 
actually making use of the stumpage rights was not as large as suggested 
in Lumber I. First, it held that furniture manufacturers own 'negligible 
rights'.31 Second, it placed great emphasis on the integrated nature of 
the softwood lumber industry with the pulp and paper industry. It found 
that the two industries tended to be made up of horizontally-integrated 
companies involved in both activities.32 In today's world of huge multi-
faceted corporations and conglomerates, this finding could have signifi-
cant repercussions. In a small marketplace such as Canada's, there is 
likely to be a number oflarge corporations involved in various aspects of 
natural resource extraction and production. This finding implies that 
any of these companies could be subject to the threat of countervailing 
dutI even if the various divisions used different equipment and process-
ing 3 and were in no way related other than in name. 34 
Once the ITA had determined that stumpage was not generally 
available, it considered whether or not stumpage was provided at 
preferential rates'. 35 In deciding whether preferential rates were given, 
the ITA applied a new rate comparison test, based on one of the following 
four factors (ranked in order of preference by the ITA): 
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[1] Prices charged by the government for a similar or 
related good; 
[2] prices charged within the jurisdiction by other sellers 
for an identical good or service; 
[3] the government's cost of producing the good or serv-
ice; and 
[ 4] external prices. 36 
The ITA decided that the appropriate test to determine 
subsidization here was the third option, the government's cost of produc-
ing the good or service. Under this test, the ITA found that Alberta, 
British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec did not recover the costs of 
providing standing timber to the holders of stumpage rights. However, 
in determining the cost of providing the lumber to the producers, the ITA 
added the "intrinsic value of the tree and the land", along with any costs 
directly associated with providing the timber.37 This imputed cost for 
the intrinsic value of the timber has been the subject of much criticism, 
especially since the provincial governments incurred no cost in obtaining 
the standing timber in the first place. 38As well, this approach is seen as 
"double counting" since any "retail" stumpage cost would already include 
direct costs. Therefore, adding the two costs would involve counting the 
direct costs twice. 
To determine the intrinsic value of the timber (no mention is 
made of land by the ITA in this portion of the decision), the ITA uses 
various 'surrogates'. For stumpage in British Columbia and Alberta, the 
ITA used "competitive bid prices under government administered pro-
grammes". Since no competitive bid prices were available from Ontario 
and Quebec, the ITA used private prices as reported from New Bruns-
wick.39 These surrogates can be attacked on two grounds:40 
1) Earlier in the decision, the ITA recognized the perils of 
comparing competitively bid and non-competitively bid stumpage 
sales, as the competitive sales were not seen as providing an 
accurate measure of price differences.41 Nonetheless, the ITA 
used competitively bid prices as surrogates to determine the 
value of the timber. This suggests that the surrogate prices may 
not be an accurate measure. 
2) In the case of Ontario and Quebec, New Brunswick prices were 
used as surrogates. However, in Lumber I, the ITA held that 
cross-border stumpage comparisons were "arbitrary and capri-
cious", due to the many differences in timber quality, accessibil-
ity, and the like. Any drawbacks of a comparison between 
Canada and the United States would also exist when using New 
Brunswick stumpage fees as surrogate pricing for Ontario and 
Quebec timber. 
The end result of the ITA's analysis was that it made a preliminary 
finding of a countervailable subsidy of fifteen per cent.42 While it is 
possible that any defects in reasoning of Lumber II would have been 
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corrected in a Final Determination, the subject never proceeded to that 
stage. 
The political considerations at the time of this decision slanted 
toward the United States lumber concerns. In late 1986, President 
Reagan sought Senate apptoval for free trade talks with Canada. 
Several Senators made it clear that their approval of such negotiations 
depended upon a satisfactory outcome to the softwood lumber dispute. 43 
The strength of such a Senate reaction has been attributed to the 
estimated $2-3 million spent on lobbying by the American lumber 
industry.44 
The Memorandum of Understanding 
On December 30, 1986, the same day that the ITA was due to. 
release its Final Determination, Canada and the United States entered 
into a Memorandum of Understanding,45 later enacted in Canada by 
the Softwood Lumber Products Export Charge Act. 46 The general thrust 
of the MOU is that Canada would impose a fifteen per cent export tax on 
softwood lumber destined for the United States in exchange for the 
withdrawal of the countervailing duty investigation. There are several 
possible reasons for Canada to enter into the MOU. 
First, the MOU enabled Canada to keep the expected $400 
million (U.S.) in tax revenues in the country, rather than enriching 
American coffers.47 The tax revenues would then be distributed to the 
affected provinces. In this way, Canada was able to make "the best out 
ofa bad situation'', since the ITA was unlikely to reverse its findings and 
since the MOU was: 
... without prejudice to the position ofeither Government 
as to whether the stumpage programs and practices of 
the Canadian governments constitute subsidies under 
United States law or any international agreement.48 
The mere signing of the MOU and the imposition of a fifteen per cent 
export tax may, however, have admitted implicitly that the United 
States position was correct.49 
Second, the MOU had the effect of rendering the Preliminary 
Determination of Lumber II of no legal force and effect. 50 The purpose 
of such a provision appears to have been to halt the development of 
United States trade law and precedent regarding the newer tests for 
specificity and 'preferential rates'. If this were the intended purpose, 
however, the MOU was not successful in stopping the evolution of United 
States trade law. 51 In fact, the de facto test laid out in the decision of the 
CIT in Cabot Corporation was later codified into American law.52 
Since the enactment of the MOU, it has been amended several 
times. Some of these amendments were made to reduce the amount of 
export tax payable in certain provinces after they implemented 'replace-
ment measures' which increased the price of timber in order to offset the 
export tax. The first amendment, which took place in December 1987, 
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exempted the Atlantic provinces from the fifteen per cent export tax as 
most stumpage prices from those provinces were bid competitively from 
privately-held land. This amendment also approved certain replace-
ment measures for the province of British Columbia that were consid-
ered equivalent to the export tax. 53 The new British Columbia meas-
ures, called the Comparative Value Pricing System, essentially target 
the amount ofrevenue that would have been raised by the export tax and 
increase the price of softwood stumpage accordingly. Quebec also later 
instituted some replacement measures under the MOU, but these were 
not enough to offset fully the export tax. 54 
The interesting feature about these replacement measures is 
that they had to be approved by the United States Department of 
Commerce. As well, in interpreting the MOU, the United States 
government stated that it would not approve any change to the MOU 
without the prior approval of the petitioning United States lumber 
interests.55 In effect, the American lumber industry was in a position 
to dictate Canadian stumpage policy. Therefore, while a tariff at the 
border or an export tax would be completely in line with state sover-
eignty, having new stumpage policy 'cleared' by foreign competitors 
seems an odd step to be agreed by the Canadian government. Once the 
agreement was signed, however, the actions taken by the United States 
government were wholly appropriate, even if they served to infringe on 
Canadian sovereignty.56 Any fault for limiting Canada's freedom to 
determine natural resource policies lay not with actions taken under the 
MOU, but the of the MOU itself. 
On a purely economic level, the MOU led to increased timber 
prices for American consumers. In addition, replacement measures 
under the MOU were not as beneficial to Canadian consumers as had 
been the export tax. The export tax, by its very nature, applied only to 
softwood lumber leaving the country. On the other hand, replacement 
measures applied across the board to all stumpage and consequently 
increased the domestic price for Canadian consumers. 
On October 3, 1991, Canada officially rescinded the MOU with 
the United States. The reasons for this were two-fold: first, Canada had 
conducted a study of the stumpage practices of British Columbia, 
Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. The Canadian study utilized the Timber 
Sale Program Information Reporting System (TSPIRS) cost-accounting 
method of the United States Forest Service to determine the stumpage 
prices. TSPIRS had been developed by the Forest Service for internal 
use (and has since been approved by Congress) to determine the proper 
value of forest resources.57 Its methodology includes a comparison of 
the costs and associated revenues of providing timber. The study 
adapted TSPIRS to the Canadian process and calculated that in each of 
the provinces revenues received from stumpage exceeded the costs of 
providing the timber.58 This approach suggests that the Canadian 
position is based upon using TSPIRS as the methodology for the "cost of 
providing the service" test articulated in Lumber II. 59 
Second, when Canada and the United States concluded the FTA, 
the MOU was specifically 'grandfathered' into the agreement.60 This 
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meant that any disputes over softwood lumber would have to be ad-
dressed under the MOU, rather than through the dispute settlement 
mechanism under the FTA. 61 The United States, however, was unwill-
ing to reopen the issue.62 Therefore, by rescinding the MOU, Canada 
was hoping to bring the dispute under the possible binding arbitration 
of a Binational Panel created under Chapter 19 of the FTA. 
The United States responded to the rescission of the MOU by 
requiring that a bond be posted by Canadian exporters, equivalent to the 
tax that would have been collected under the MOU.63 As well, the 
United States government took the rare step of self-initiating a 
countervailing duty investigation into Canadian stumpage practices, 
without a formal complainant from the American lumber industry. 64 
The United States considers that these measures are merely 'enforce-
ment measures' under the MOU and, therefore, are exempt from consid-
eration under the FTA.65 This view also holds that any countervailing 
duty later imposed by the United States government would not be open 
for review under the FTA, since the MOU had been specifically ex-
empted. 
CANADIAN AND AMERICAN POSITIONS 
The arguments now presented by Canada are variations on the 
same theme that has run through the entire softwood lumber dispute. 
First, Canada rejects the contention that natural resource subsidies can 
be considered countervailable. Second, in the alternative, even if 
natural resource subsidies can be considered countervailable, Canada 
argues that its practices with regard to softwood lumber stumpage 
pricing do not constitute subsidies under United States trade law. 
The first facet of the argument is being pursued by Canada at 
GATT. It is unclear why Canada decided not to pursue actions before 
GATT prior to the current investigation. The question of whether 
natural resources can be the subject of countervailing duties is the same 
today as it was in both 1983 and 1986. Once the MOU was signed, 
however, both parties probably assumed the dispute was settled and 
likely perceived no need to go before GATT. That Canada decided to 
bring the action to GATT is in itself not surprising, since the action 
requires expertise on the definition of 'subsidy' under GATT. Actions 
such as these do not suggest 'forum shopping' between GATT and 
Chapter 18 oftheFTA,66 at least not until Canada and the United States 
have agreed upon a subsidies code under the FTA. 
GATT 
The arguments before GATT depend upon the interpretation of 
'subsidy' and acceptable countervailing duties under Articles VI and XVI 
of GATT. This discussion will focus upon 'domestic subsidies' as both 
previous softwood lumber decisions have rejected stumpage fees as 
export subsidies. 
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Article XVI in no way prohibits the free pricing of government-
owned resources, nor domestic subsidies on natural resources, except 
insofar as to say that any subsidy should not result in that country 
"having more than an equitable share of world trade in that product". 67 
Article 11 of the Subsidies Code agreed upon at the Tokyo Round of 
GATT68 recognizes the value of domestic subsidies and calls upon GATT 
signatories to "seek to avoid causing [injury to another signatory's 
industry] through the use of subsidies."69 These provisions are not 
determinative of the issue at hand. Other applicable provisions can be 
found in GATT Article VI and its interpretation in the Subsidies Code. 
Article VI deals with the imposition of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties. Article VI:3 allows the imposition of countervailing 
duties to counteract a "bounty or subsidy ... granted, directly or indi-
rectly, on the manufacture, production or export" of a product. In the 
Subsidies Code, an illustrative list of what is considered a subsidy was 
given. 70 While natural resource subsidies were not included in the list, 
Article VI:3 appears broad enough to cover low stumpage fees, if they are 
considered an indirect bounty or subsidy to Canadian lumber produc-
ers. 71 However, as an exception to the Most-Favoured-Nation treat-
ment under GATT, Article VI:3 has in the past been construed narrowly, 
with the party relying on the exception being required to prove it. 72 If 
a panel were to give such a narrow reading to Article VI:3 in this case, 
the dispute would probably be resolved in Canada's favour, as the actual 
payment of a "bounty or grant" is not apparent in this case, where the 
issue is the selling price of a government-owned resource. 
In addition to arguments based on the current formulation of 
GATT, some drafts of the GATT Uruguay Round Subsidies Code would 
work in Canada's favour. 73 For example, Article 14(e) reads (in part) as 
follows: 
When the government is the sole provider or purchaser 
of the good or service in question, the provision or 
purchase of such good or service shall not be considered 
as conferring a benefit, unless the government discrimi-
nates among users or providers of the good or service 
74 
Whatever the resolution of the dispute at GATT, any GATT Panel's 
results are not binding. The onus would be upon Canada or the United 
States to implement the panel's findings as they saw fit. 75 If the panel's 
findings were rejected, they would have no legal impact on any FTA 
Panel, but the decision might be of some persuasive merit. 
On one hand, an extra benefit of a GATT Panel ruling would be 
that particular American legislation could be challenged as being incon-
sistent with GATTobligations. On the other hand, a panel created under 
Chapter 19 of the FTA would be bound to interpret the matter in 
accordance with existing United States trade law, whether or not they 
agreed with the validity of such legislation. 
SOFTWOOD LUMBER 
United States Trade Law 
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The situation has changed fundamentally since the preliminary 
positive determination of Lumber II. Since that time, Canada and the 
United States have signed the FTA and many Canadian lumber pricing 
practices are significantly different (including replacement measures 
under the MOU), while United States trade law is roughly the same. 76 
Chapter 19 of the FTA allows for a Binational Panel to be created 
to review final anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations. 
The decisions of this panel are binding upon the appropriate administra-
tive agency (here, the ITA). As the softwood lumber dispute is so 
vigorously contested, it is almost assured that no matter what determi-
nation is made by the ITA, the dispute will proceed to the Binational 
Panel. While the United States contends that the current 'enforcement 
measures' are components of the MOU and therefore exempted from 
FTA consideration, the following discussion is premised on the assump-
tion that the rescission of the MOU will be considered sufficient to 
surpass the exemption given to the MOU under Article 2009 of the FTA. 
Since the FTA is intended to be an all-encompassing document, an 
exemption related to a validly rescinded agreement makes little sense. 
Therefore, it appears likely that investigations of softwood lumber 
practices will fall under the purview of the FTA, rather than being 
considered as 'enforcement measures' under the MOU. 
Prior to the implementation of the FTA, analysts predicted that 
Chapter 19 Binational Panels would show considerable deference and 
not be willing to contradict ITA (or ITC) practice unless it were found to 
be 'unreasonable'. 77 However, this has not turned out to be the case; as 
of July, 1991, four panel decisions had been made reversing final 
determinations of the ITA or ITC in favour of Canadian interests.78 In 
particular, one decision of the panel reviewing an ITA determination on 
pork 79 is of note for the softwood lumber dispute. In that decision, the 
panel showed a willingness to second-guess the application of the de 
facto specificity test by the ITA. The panel ruled not only against the 
ITA, but also placed the added burden on the ITA (or the complainant) 
to prove with "convincing circumstantial or actual evidence" that the 
exporting government was in fact limiting the benefits to a specific 
industry or group of industries. 80 Therefore, any decision of the ITA on 
softwood lumber would likely be subject to a higher standard of review 
than would have been the case in 1986. Because of this new level of 
scrutiny, Canadian officials are hoping that the ITA will take this into 
account in its reasoning, so that logical flaws similar to those which 
occurred in Lumber II will not repeat themselves in the current investi-
gation. Bl 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Softwood lumber and natural resource subsidies have been the 
subject of many political, economic, and legal analyses. An overview 
such as this cannot but scratch the surface of the dispute. Nonetheless, 
it can serve to point out the substantive areas of dispute. 
The true question of whether Canadian stumpage fees represent 
a countervailable subsidy is, in essence, a reflection of the difference in 
lumber practices between Canada and the United States. In the end, the 
cost of delivering cut logs to the sawmill is roughly the same in both 
countries.82 Therefore, it can be argued that the ability to provide low 
cost stumpage in Canada and the ability to harvest the logs at a lower 
cost in the United States provides each country with a comparative 
advantage.83 Neither country wishes to give up what it sees as its 
competitive edge over the neighbouring country. By the same token, 
American lumber interests would likely not complain about low stumpage 
rates if they could take advantage of them as well. Yet many provinces 
have placed restrictions upon the export of logs. 84 Therefore, only 
sawmills located in Canada can benefit from lower priced (or subsidized) 
stumpage. Thus, the true trade barrier could be seen as log export 
restraints rather than stumpage practices.85 
Another complicating factor is that the market share of Cana-
dian lumber in the United States does not appear to be as tied to the cost 
of stumpage as to the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar86 and the 
sheer volume of timber actually available for harvest in Canada.87 
Thus, when the MOU came into force in 1987, the output of the Canadian 
lumber industry remained relatively unchanged. 88 While United States 
producers might benefit from the imposition of a countervailing duty 
(from increased costs to their competitors) in the short run, the long run 
picture would not be greatly affected. Canadian producers would still 
have a greater supply of timber and American producers would still be 
at a comparative disadvantage. In the long run, American producers 
would have a proportionately lower volume of timber than their Cana-
dian counterparts due to the extra harvesting of timber that would take 
place with a short term increase in market share. Perhaps the appropri-
ate remedy for the softwood lumber dispute (as well as others dealing 
with natural resources) is not the blunt imposition of trade laws. The 
nations involved should instead negotiate to remove the other barriers 
to trade, while recognizing each region's distinct comparative position 
(stumpage fees, quality of timber, accessibility, and so on). This argu-
ment especially rings true with the current focus on environmental 
concerns and the priority placed on preserving forests and reforesta-
tion.89 
The political stakes of the current dispute are as high as ever. 
Both Canada and the United States will be facing major elections in the 
coming years and the politicians involved will probably take less compro-
mising stances on this issue than would otherwise be the case. The 
American lumber lobby has already been pushing heavily for sanctions 
and has been accredited with the speed with which the United States 
83 
SOFTWOOD LUMBER 
Department of Commerce launched its current investigation. 90 As well, 
if this dispute goes to a Binational Panel, which is likely, the outcome will 
be very important for future Canada-United States trade disputes. In 
1991, the highly politicized question regarding injury to American 
producers from lower priced Canadian pork resulted in the United 
States pursuit of an extraordinary challenge under the FTA.91 In that 
matter, the ITC showed considerable displeasure with the functioning of 
the Binational Panel. 92 If a similar situation arose with the ITA over a 
decision of a Binational Panel on softwood lumber, the entire Chapter 19 
dispute resolution process might be placed in jeopardy, as the United 
States government might consider the panels biased towards Canadian 
interests. Such a development is mere speculation at this point, 
however, as the dispute has not yet progressed through the full ITA 
process. 
The apparent strength of the American lumber lobby and the 
comparative weakness of its Canadian counterpart suggests that the 
ITA will find in favour of the American producers.93 Nonetheless, the 
Canadian lumber producers are confident that they will win in any 
decision 'on the merits'. As discussed throughout this study, the true 
'merits' of this case are unclear. For example, the Canadian Maritime 
provinces have even decided to side with the American lumber industry 
against the other provinces, 94 while a prominent newspaper in the 
United States Pacific Northwest (a major softwood lumber-producing 
region) has supported the Canadian position. 95 Regardless of the 
outcome, it is unlikely that the affected provinces will give up the 
revenues obtained through any replacement measures. In British 
Columbia, for instance, revenues from stumpage fees account for five per 
cent of the total provincial budget.96 
So long as there is an opportunity for one side to gain a short-
term competitive advantage through the use of trade laws, the issue of 
softwood lumber will probably never be far from the forefront. Its 
importance to provincial and state economies guarantees that those 
affected will try to gain every competitive advantage possible. Because 
of this problem, it seems unlikely that there will be a negotiated 
comprehensive settlement of this dispute in the near future and poten-
tially unpredictable trade laws will continue to be the method of choice. 
As was succinctly put by a former American lobbyist: "It's better than the 
lottery ... It's just such a jackpot; if you win, you win big. You do the 
financial calculations, and you'd be foolish not to roll the dice."97 
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